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Abstract 
One of the key concepts in Buddhist meditation is mindfulness which has recently been 
introduced into new environments, including contemporary yoga. This paper identifies 
some of the parameters involved in the rather seamless integration of Buddhist 
mindfulness and yoga and explores whether this synthesis is an ancient one, already found 
in the oldest recorded text on yoga, the Yogasūtra, by investigating if the word smṛti, 
usually translated as “memory,” can refer to mindfulness. This would imply that 
mindfulness may have been a component of ancient yogic practices, although perhaps lost 
at some stage in the transmission only to be reintroduced recently by the syncretistic new 
trends in the globalised spiritual movements. 
Keywords: Yogasūtra, Patañjali, modern yoga, mindfulness, modern Buddhism  
Izvleček 
Eden od osnovnih konceptov budistične meditacije je pozornost ali čuječnost. V zadnjih 
desetletjih se je praksa meditacijske pozornosti razširila na številna nova področja, med 
drugim tudi v sodobne jogijske prakse. Prispevek poskuša identificirati nekaj glavnih 
parametrov, ki pogojujejo integracijo budistične meditacije in joge in raziskuje, ali je 
koncept pozornosti morda bil prisoten že v najstarejšem poznanem besedilu o jogi, v 
Yogasūtri. V tem besedilu se večkrat pojavi koncept smṛti, ki je ponavadi preveden kot 
»spomin«. Prispevek predlaga novo intepretacijo tega koncepta in ga prevaja kot 
»meditacijska pozornost«. Nova interpretacija odpira vprašanje, ali je praksa pozornosti 
bila prisotna že v starodavnih jogijskih praksah, a se je pri prenosu jogijskih tradicij 
izgubila in se šele danes ponovno pojavila v jogi kot odsev sinkretističnih duhovnih gibanj 
21. stoletja.   
Ključne besede: Yogasūtra, Patañjali, sodobna yoga, pozornost, sodobni budizem  
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1 Introduction 
Yoga and Buddhism, two closely related ancient Indian religious traditions, seem 
to be undergoing a new integration in the contemporary world. In the last decade, 
mindfulness has been increasingly introduced as a component of yogic practices, 
especially in the “Western” world (e.g. Boccio 2004).1 The most obvious reason 
for this new development seems to be the frequent involvement of many 
contemporary teachers and practitioners of yoga in Buddhist meditation––most of 
them would actively practice or at least have some experience of mindfulness and 
consequently, they aim to integrate various aspects of the two traditions.
2
 Before 
new meanings and functions of mindfulness in modern Yoga and modern 
Buddhism
3
 are explored, it is important to situate the concept of mindfulness in the 
historical context, i.e. to briefly outline the origins and the semantic history of this 
important meditation tool. 
 
2 The Roots of Mindfulness 
Most traditional schools of Buddhism view mindfulness (Pāli sati, Sanskrit smṛti) 
as one of the key elements of Buddhist meditation. Interpretations of mindfulness 
that have evolved in modern Buddhism very frequently refer back to Theravāda 
sources, hence this overview of the roots of mindfulness draws from the 
Theravāda Buddhist canon and consequently, the technical terms for mindfulness 
and the related concepts are given (in brackets) in Pāli. In the earliest textual 
records the word mindfulness (sati) seems to appear in two broader senses: (1) 
occasionally, it refers to “memory, recollection” or, more precisely, to a mental 
factor which facilitates memory rather than referring to memory itself (Anālayo 
2006, 46); (2) frequently, the term refers to mindfulness as awareness of the 
present moment (i.e. observation of mental and physical processes from moment 
to moment) which the Canonical texts describe mainly through attributes and 
                                                 
1  The term “Western” in inverted commas is used here, with some hesitation, to refer to the 
contemporary societies of MEDC (more economically developed countries) such as North America, 
Europe, Australia.   
2 Contemporary yogic schools of India seem to follow their traditional paths more consistently and 
hence do not incorporate innovations easily, at least not as fast as yogic schools in the “West.” 
3 Here I use the term “modern yoga” as defined by De Michelis (2004, 1–6), referring to yogic 
practices that evolved over the last 150 years through interaction between India and the “West.” 
Similarly, I use the term “modern Buddhism” to encompass a wide range of Buddhist beliefs and 
practices that developed over the last hundred years and have become in the last few decades global 
phenomena, often included under the umbrella term “Buddhism.” 
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functions such as: presence, wakefulness, strong cognition, boundlessness etc.
4
 
Although the interrelation between the two meanings of sati has been discussed by 
several scholars (e.g. Gethin 2011), many aspects of the overlaps and differences 
between the two interpretations need further investigation which, however, lies 
outside the scope of this article. 
Early Buddhist texts distinguish several concepts that are closely related to 
mindfulness and yet to be distinguished from it. An important concept is attention 
or awareness (manasikāra): it is, according to the Abhidhamma¸ a mental factor 
(cetasika) which occurs with every mind moment and functions as the bare 
cognition of an object before it is identified and conceptualized (see e.g. Bodhi, 
81). When attention is accompanied by understanding of what is wholesome or not 
it is called wise attention (yoniso manasikāra); it facilitates the development of 
mindfulness and wisdom—the two factors that are indispensable on the path to 
final spiritual liberation (Anālayo 2006, 58). All Buddhist texts position 
mindfulness as an integral part of the Buddhist path; mindfulness is one of the five 
faculties and powers; the first of the seven factors of enlightenment and one of the 
components of the noble eightfold path. Mindfulness as a component of the noble 
eightfold path is called right mindfulness (sammā sati), defined in the refrain of 
the Satipaṭṭhānasutta as mindfulness (sati) which is accompanied by freedom 
from desire and aversion (vineyya abhijjhādomanassa), clear comprehension 
(sampajāna) and diligence (ātāpī) (Anālayo 2006, 49). Right mindfulness is 
strongly associated with and linked to the ethical and soteriological aspects of the 
Buddhist doctrine: it provides an understanding as to whether mental states are 
wholesome or not; protects the mind from reacting with desire and aversion; and, 
together with clear comprehension, provides the foundation for wisdom and 
consequently, is an indispensable tool and constituent on the path to nibbāna.  
The practice of mindfulness as the path to liberation is discussed in several 
canonical and post-canonical texts; e.g., many discourses in the Aṅguttara Nikāya 
and the Saṃyutta Nikāya, as well as in Chinese Āgamas and in several Sanskrit 
Buddhist texts. One of the prominent canonical texts on meditation is the 
                                                 
4  E.g. the Visuddhimagga (XIV, 141), an important source of meditation methods for modern 
Buddhism, defines mindfulness: “By its means they remember (saranti), or it itself remembers, or it 
is just mere remembering (saraṇa) thus it is mindfulness (sati). It has the characteristic of not 
wobbling. Its function is not to forget. It is manifested as guarding, or it is manifested as the state of 
confronting an objective field. Its proximate cause is strong perception, or its proximate cause is the 
Foundations of Mindfulness, concerned with the body and so on (see Majjhima Nikāya Sutta 10). It 
should be regarded, however, as like a pillar because it is firmly founded, or as like a door-keeper 
because it guards the eye-door, and so on” (Buddhaghosa 1956, 524). 
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Satipaṭṭhānasutta (“Discourse on the establishment of mindfulness”)5 which has 
received the most elevated position as the ur-text on mindfulness in modern 
Buddhism (e.g. Ñāṇapoṇika 1962, 11). This veneration of the text started “in the 
colonial era as the schools of Buddhism attempted to respond to the challenges of 
the modern age” (Sujato 2005, 113), particularly in Burma, emphasizing the 
rational aspects of meditation, aiming to authenticate and legitimize new methods 
of meditation through the canonical texts and the Satipaṭṭhānasutta in particular. 
The Satipaṭṭhānasutta discusses four areas of contemplation: mindfulness of the 
body (kāyā), feelings (vedanā), mind (citta) and mental objects (dhamma), 
however, according to several canonical texts (e.g. Saṃyutta Nikāya V 182) any 
single satipaṭṭhāna meditation can lead to liberation which may be why several 
modern meditation teachers (e.g. U Ba Khin) have recommended a single area of 
mindfulness as the path to enlightenment.  
 
3 New Interpretations of Mindfulness 
Although the concept of mindfulness has been known in the “West” since the 
European discovery of Buddhism in the nineteenth century, it is only in the last 
few decades that the practice of mindfulness has spread globally. Even a brief look 
at various book lists, journals and magazines on meditation, numerous 
publications and websites on psychotherapy and related areas, indicates that 
mindfulness is not only a major component of Buddhist meditation, but has been 
rapidly entering new environments. It is frequently applied in various forms of 
psychotherapy such as therapy for depression, anxiety disorders, pain management, 
working with children, relationship counselling, and has also been introduced into 
the work place and even in the corporate world, with courses such as mindful 
leadership, to name just a few. In these new milieux the meaning and function of 
mindfulness has been changing significantly. 
In most Buddhist traditions, since the early beginnings, the ethical and 
soteriological functions of right mindfulness have been in the forefront. As 
mentioned earlier, Buddhism distinguishes awareness/attention, mindfulness and 
right mindfulness; however, these aspects have been modified or given new 
interpretations in modern Buddhism as well as in new secular contexts. The 
                                                 
5 Two versions of this sutta are found in the Theravāda Canon, a shorter one in the Majjhima Nikāya 
(M I 55–3), and a longer one in the Dīgha Nikāya (D II 305–15; this version gives a longer 
explanation of the four noble truths). 
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characteristic of mindfulness that is most emphasized by modern meditation 
teachers is bare awareness, with its non-interfering, uninvolved quality (sometimes 
it is called “choiceless awareness.” the term introduced by J. Krishnamurti). New 
interpretations of mindfulness focus particularly on one aspect of mindfulness 
(sati), i.e., attention to and awareness of the present moment, often adding that it is 
to be practiced in a non-judging way.
6
 Although modern Buddhist meditation 
teachings have retained, at least to some extent, the ethical and soteriological 
aspects of the practice of mindfulness, there is an increasing emphasis on its 
psychotherapeutic roles; e.g. “insight” is often interpreted in a new way, with more 
emphasis on understanding of or “insight” into the psychological content or past 
conditionings of an individual which may surface during the meditation practice in 
contrast to the traditional Buddhist “insight” which refers to an understanding of 
the three characteristics of existence (i.e. suffering, impermanence, and non-self) 
and aims at their complete eradication. Hence the popular definition of 
mindfulness often quoted in psychotherapeutic contexts presents mindfulness as 
“the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present 
moment, and nonjudgementally” (Kabat-Zinn 2003, 145). Numerous studies 
indicate that mindfulness is helpful for a wide spectrum of problems and disorders 
independently from the Buddhist religious system and these studies view it as a 
tool for improving well-being; e.g. Baer (2006, 10) states that mindfulness leads to 
“the ability to make adaptive decisions about handling difficult and problematic 
situations as they arise, as well as increased enjoyment of pleasant moments”—
stating aims significantly different from the Buddhist perspective which seeks 
freedom from desires, and from attachment to pleasure. Typically mindfulness-
based therapies often combine awareness of the body and breath and sometimes 
include postural yoga (Baer 2006, 3–26), which aims at a kind of integration of 
yoga and mindfulness. This synthesis of the elements from the two traditions has 
not been occurring only in psychotherapeutic contexts but, especially in the last 
decade, many Buddhist meditation retreats include yogic practices and in turn, 
contemporary schools of yoga increasingly introduce mindfulness. 
 
                                                 
6 The attribute “non-judging” does not stem from Buddhist traditions; it was coined, as far as I am 
aware, by Kornfield (e.g. 2012, 2). 
Tamara DITRICH: The Concept of smṛti in the Yogasūtra 
50 
4 Yoga and Mindfulness: New Developments 
In Sanskrit, the term yoga is polyvalent, covering a very wide semantic field: in a 
broader sense it signifies any spiritual path or practice within Indian religious 
traditions; in a narrower sense it refers to classical yoga, based on the Yogasūtra of 
Patañjali and its commentaries. In modern English the term yoga is most 
commonly associated with various yogic practices focusing on postures, based on 
haṭhayoga; hence De Michelis introduces a new term for this practice, i.e. 
“Postural Yoga,” or “Neo-Haṭhayoga” (2004, 8). Similarly as modern Buddhism 
situates the Satipaṭṭhānasutta to be the root text for the practice of mindfulness; 
modern yoga views the Yogasūtra to be its ur-text. The Yogasūtra that we know 
today is attributed to Patañjali, traditionally placed in the second century B.C.E. or, 
by modern scholarship, into approximately the second century C.E. In India the 
text is frequently invoked as a legitimate authority for practitioners of yoga which 
is largely based on postural yoga, although the text itself does not talk about 
postures and gives no evidence for āsana practice. Patañjali has even become a 
focus of devotion and the ritual recitation of this sūtra has elevated the text by 
treating it almost in a similar manner as Vedic texts (Singleton 2008, 91–92).  
Since the 1990s, the proliferation of mindfulness-focused activities has also 
been reflected in modern yoga where it has been introduced as a therapeutic as 
well as a spiritual tool. The merging of the two traditions raises several questions: 
why has mindfulness been integrated into modern yoga rather seamlessly; what is 
the meaning and function of mindfulness in modern yoga; why is mindfulness 
most frequently introduced in those branches of modern yoga that focus on āsanas 
and praṇāyāma such as Iyengar yoga; why is there a need to integrate mindfulness 
into modern yoga in the first place—what function does mindfulness supplement 
that yoga is perceived not to provide? 
The two most widespread modern approaches to mindfulness are those 
popularized by Goenka (based on U Ba Khin’s method) and by Mahasi Sayadaw; 
both methods focus, at least initially, on mindfulness of the body and breath. In 
modern postural yoga, particularly in Iyengar yoga which is arguably the most 
widespread yoga today, the main focus of practice is the body (the practice of 
āsanas), with a secondary focus on breath (prāṇāyama). 7  In the last decade, 
                                                 
7 Although Iyengar frequently uses in his classes the term awareness in relation to āsanas, his usage 
of this term might have been introduced partly through his encounters with J. Krishnamurti who used 
the term “choiceless awareness” as one of the key concepts in meditation. Iyengar does not talk about 
mindfulness in a Buddhist sense. 
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“Western” practitioners of yoga have introduced mindfulness into yogic 
vocabulary, usually as a synonym for awareness of the posture, and sometimes 
also of sensations, feelings and mental states that arise when one is in a yogic 
posture. Although Buddhist and Yogic traditions have regarded themselves 
throughout their histories as spiritual paths, each providing complete practical and 
soteriological frameworks that would not require the introduction of additional 
practices, the synthesis of yoga and Buddhism, initiated in the “West,” has been 
very slowly transferred also into more traditional religious environments of Asia. 
Mindfulness in yoga is usually understood as awareness/attention which supports 
practitioners to be in the present moment, to improve their focus on bodily 
postures and the breath (e.g. Boccio 2004). The prevalent newly interpreted 
function of mindfulness as a therapeutic tool is increasingly being incorporated 
into modern yoga which has itself become in the last two decades largely 
secularised and medicalised, viewed as a “healing” practice to relieve stress, 
instrumental in building up “health and fitness” (De Michelis 2008, 24–26). 
Furthermore, mindful yoga has become commodified in the global consumer 
society where a proliferation of new types, styles and methods has been introduced 
and marketed in the yoga industry (Singleton and Byrne 2008, 1–2). However, on 
the other hand, it seems that mindfulness may provide for modern yoga a new 
focus, especially to the practice of āsanas, largely perceived as physical activity, 
often aiming to achieve greater fitness and flexibility; and thus viewed as lacking 
the spiritual or soteriological dimensions which are still present, though at the 
background, in Buddhist meditation.  
The rather seamless integration of the two traditions may have been facilitated 
by a strong compatibility between the primary focus on āsanas and prāṇāyama in 
modern yoga and the primary focus on mindfulness of the body and breath in 
modern Buddhist meditation. In a larger historical context, the easy synthesis has 
been facilitated by several syncretistic movements starting in the late 19
th
 century 
with the new developments such as the Theosophical Society and the Neo-vedānta 
in India, and later on, the emergence of the New Age movements in the 1970s, all 
of these encompass a great variety of spiritual traditions based on the idea of the 
“oneness” of all religions.8 The belief that all traditions lead to the same goal, that 
spiritual liberation or enlightenment is the same experience in all religions 
provides an environment in which it is very easy to transpose a method from 
                                                 
8  A thorough exploration of New Age religions and Neo-Vedānta as influential components in 
modern yoga is the main component of De Michelis’s book on modern yoga (2004). 
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another tradition. Thus, on the one hand, mindfulness has emerged in modern yoga 
as a therapeutic tool and on the other hand, it provides a spiritual background to 
secularized postural yoga. Its ethical component is usually not emphasized, and the 
traditional aim, spiritual liberation, is not a fully articulated goal but remains a 
rather distant and elusive possibility.  
 
5 Mindfulness in Classical Yoga? 
The relatively new integration of the two traditions prompts an enquiry into the 
question as to whether the synthesis of mindfulness and yoga is a new 
phenomenon or perhaps an ancient one, found already in old Indian texts on yoga, 
and whether indications of practise of mindfulness may be surmised already in the 
oldest recorded text on yoga, the Yogasūtra, the ur-text of modern yogic traditions. 
The Yogasūtra, attributed by the tradition to Patañjali, is a collection of 195 very 
brief aphorisms, usually situated in the second century C.E., though probably 
founded on a significantly older tradition, though there is no clear evidence of its 
pre-Buddhist origins. The text has received several traditional commentaries, the 
most important among them include: the Yogabhāṣya (“Exposition on Yoga”), the 
oldest commentary by Vyāsa, probably from the fifth century C.E.; the 
Tattvavaiśāradī (“Clarity of Truth”) by Vācaspatimiśra from the ninth century C. 
E.; and the subcommentary Rājamārtaṇḍa (“Royal Sun”) by Bhoja from the 
eleventh century.
9
 
In ancient Indian religions, the technical terminology used is specific to a 
particular tradition and hence, texts usually introduce and define their own meta-
language. Such is also the case in the Yogasūtra where many, but not all, technical 
terms are defined in the text itself.
10
 Modern interpreters often rely, in their 
translations of these terms, on later commentaries on the Yogasūtra such as 
Vyāsa’s and Vacaspatimiśra’s or sometimes draw from other Indian religious 
traditions; modern Indian translators frequently draw from Vedānta and modern 
theistic movements. Consequently, when reading translations of, and 
                                                 
9 Among later commentaries the following can be listed: the Vivarana (“Exposition”) by Śaṅkara, 
somewhere between the ninth and the fifteenth century; the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha by Mādhava in 
the fourteenth century; the Maṇi-prabhā by Rāmānanda Yati in the sixteenth century; the Laghvī and 
the Bṛhati by Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa and the Yoga-vārttika and the Yoga-sāra–saṃgraha by Vijñāna Bhikṣu 
in the sixteenth century. 
10 E.g. citta is not defined in the Yogasūtra nor is it listed as one of the tattvas.  
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commentaries on, the Yogasūtra, we have to be aware of the entire context of the 
particular period and tradition of the interpreters. 
The Sanskrit word smṛti which occurs several times in the Yogasūtra, is quite 
consistently translated into English by most translators as “memory” (e.g. Woods 
1914; Bangali 1976; Feuerstein 1989; Whicher 1995) or “remembering” (Hartranft 
2003). As indicated earlier, there seems to be a close relationship and overlap 
between the two meanings of the term smṛti (Pāli sati) in Buddhism; the question 
here is whether the Yogasūtra, which is dated in the period when Buddhism 
flourished in India, may reflect both meanings of the term as well. There are 
instances in the text that evidence an influence of Buddhism on the Yogasūtra as 
noted already by several scholars (e.g. La Vallée-Poussin 1937, 223–42; Larson 
1989, 129–46; Bronkhorst 1993, 71–77) which further incite inquiry into whether 
smṛti allows, besides being rendered as “memory,” alternative readings.  
The term smṛti occurs in the Yogasūtra in six sūtras: four occurrences are in 
the first chapter (samādhipāda) which presents the foundations of yogic practice, 
and two occurrences in the fourth chapter (kaivalyapāda) which is the concluding 
section where, among other topics, the transformation and liberation of 
consciousness are discussed. The Yogasūtra starts with the definition of yoga as 
being the cessation of the fluctuations of consciousness and then continues, in 
sūtra 1.6, with the listing of five types of fluctuations.  
1.6: pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtaya 
[the fivefold fluctuations of consciousness are:] valid cognition, 
misperception, conceptualization/imagination, sleep and 
memory/mindfulness.
11
 
Here the text specifies what can occur within consciousness (citta); the term smṛti, 
being one of the five kinds of fluctuations, is consistently translated by all English 
translators as “memory” (e.g. Woods 1983, 19; Feuerstein 1989, 30) or 
                                                 
11  All translations from Sanskrit are made by the author, partly drawing from translations by 
Feuerstein (1989) and Houston (1995). The Sanskrit text is translated into English only tentatively; 
the wide spectrum of possible renderings is sometimes marked by a forward slash, indicating that the 
given translation is rather optional. Only those Sanskrit terms are discussed here that have a direct 
relevance to the concept of smṛti.  
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“remembering” (Hartranft 2003, 5). Then the sūtra proceeds to define each of 
these five types of fluctuations of consciousness,
12
 the last being smṛti. 
1.11: anubhūta-viṣaya-asaṃpramoṣaḥsmṛti 
Memory/mindfulness is not losing an experienced [sense-]object. 
The term smṛti rendered as “memory” would imply that the object experienced is 
recalled from the past—which is the interpretation given by most translators and 
commentators; however, the sūtra gives no direct indication for this reading. The 
earliest commentator Vyāsa (probably from the fifth century C.E.) opens his 
comments with a question about whether the mind “remembers” (or, if read 
alternatively, “is mindful of”) cognition or the object of cognition.13 He continues 
that both cognition and the object are “remembered,” 14  actually what is 
“remembered” (or read alternatively, “what one is one mindful of”) are mental 
impressions (saṃskāras), which manifest under appropriate conditions.15 Vyāsa’s 
interpretation of smṛti can be paralleled by the notion of the Buddhist concept of 
mindfulness (smṛti/sati) which is presented in the Abhidhamma as a mental factor 
(cetasika) that knows cognition and/or the object of cognition arising through one 
of the six senses (e.g. Bodhi, 1993, 286–87); it is similarly described in numerous 
passages of the Suttapiṭaka, particularly in the dhammanupassanā section of the 
Satipaṭṭhānasutta. Later commentators on the Yogasūtra attribute to the term smṛti 
functions that could be rendered into English as “memory”; e.g. Vācaspatimiśra 
defines: “smṛti is concerned with objects which have already been made the object 
of one of the other fluctuations.”16 All modern English translations interpret smṛti 
in this sūtra as “memory” or “recollection” (e.g. Whicher 1998, 117; Woods 1914, 
32; Bangali 1976, 6) or “remembering” (Feuerstein 1989, 33; Houston 1995, 1.11; 
Hartranft 2003, 6). It is only in the earliest commentary by Vyāsa that smṛti may 
be alternatively interpreted as mindfulness. 
                                                 
12 The first four terms are briefly described in the sūtra: pramāṇa “valid cognition” comprises direct 
perception, inference and testimony; viparyaya “misperception” is false knowledge founded on 
appearance of what is not that; vikalpa “conceptualization/imagination” is without object, relying on 
language; nidrā “sleep” is a fluctuation founded on non-existent awareness. 
13 Yogabhāṣya 1. 11: kiṃ pratyayasya cittaṃ smarati āhosvidviṣayasyeti (Arjunwadkar, 17). 
14  Ibid.: grāhyoparaktaḥ pratyayo grāhyagrahaṇobhayākāranirbhāsastajjātīyakaṃ 
saṃskāramārabhate (Arjunwadkar 2006, 17). 
15 Ibid.: sa saṃskāraḥsvavyañjakāñjanastadākārāmeva grāhyagrahaṇobhayātmikāṃ smṛtim janayati 
(Arjunwadkar 2006, 17). 
16 Tattvavaiśāradī 1.11.2: prāptipūrvāvāttiḥ smṛtistataḥ smṛtināmupajana ityarthaū (Arjunwadkar 
2006, 17). 
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The following sūtras explicate how the cessation is achieved through practice 
(abhyāsa) and detachment (vairāgya) and list two types of cessation: distinguished 
(saṃprajñāta) which is accompanied by cognition and non-distinguished 
(asaṃprajñāta) without cognition. The latter is achieved when preceded by the 
five faculties, presented in 1.20. 
1.20 śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samnādhi-prajñā-pūrvaka itareṣām 
[Cessation] of the others [asaṃprajñāta] is preceded by faith, energy, 
memory/mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. 
The five faculties described in this sūtra are to be developed before the cessation 
of the fluctuations of consciousness (asaṃprajñātasamādhi) is achieved. These 
faculties are identical (and even listed verbatim in the same order) to the 
frequently attested Buddhist five faculties (indriya) and powers (bala), usually 
translated as “faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom.” Although all 
translators of the Yogasūtra generally interpret smṛti as memory, in this sūtra only 
some translate this term as mindfulness (but render it memory in other sūtras) and 
acknowledge that sūtra 1.20 may reflect Buddhist influence: e.g. Feuerstein 
translates the term smṛti as mindfulness, defining it as “the practice of 
concentration and meditation,” and suggests that although the set of the five 
faculties may stem from Buddhism it may equally be “not particular to any one 
tradition” (1989, 40–41). Woods (1914, 20) renders the term as “mindfulness” and 
briefly acknowledges the Buddhist parallels. Vyāsa does not define or explain the 
term smṛti in this sūtra but focuses on how the five faculties condition one another 
respectively: from well-established faith arises energy, from energy memory, 
which further conditions mindfulness, concentration and wisdom or insight; hence, 
in his view, mindfulness is conducive to samādhi.17 Later commentators follow 
Vyāsa, further discussing how one factor leads to another and also give various 
equivalents for smṛti: most of them (i.e. Vācaspatimiṣra, Vijñānabhikṣu, 
Nāgojībhaṭṭa) equate smṛti with the term dhyāna, the seventh limb of the “eight-
limbed yoga” (aṣṭāṅgayoga) which is usually translated into English as 
“meditation” (Arjunwadkar 2006, 24–25) or interpret the term as “the recollection 
of past objects” (Maharaj 2013, 75). Dasgupta (1924, 102) follows these 
commentators and translates the term as “meditation,” however, he does not link 
the five faculties to Buddhism but argues that they are actually only aspects of 
yogic detachment (vairāgya) and practice (abhyāsa) (1924, 129). To my 
                                                 
17 Yogabhāṣya 1. 20: smṛtyupasthāne ca cittamanākulaṃ samādhīyate (Arjunwadkar 2006, 26). 
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knowledge, only one traditional interpreter, Hariharānanda Āraṇya from the turn 
of the 20
th
 century, attempts in his Pātañjalyogadarśan (published in 1911) to 
interpret the term smṛti as mindfulness or “continual mindfulness” (sadā 
samanaskatā) (Maharaj 2013, 64), and views it as the precondition for the 
development of dhyāna.18 Although his interpretation occurred a century ago and 
seems to be more plausible than traditional readings of smṛti it has not received 
sufficient scholarly attention so far (Maharaj 2013, 59, 77). It is evident that 
among the passages from the Yogasūtra discussed here in relation to smṛti, sūtra 
1.20 indicates Buddhist influence most strikingly; several scholars have 
acknowledged this (e.g. La Vallée-Poussin 1937; Larson 1989); Bronkhorst (1993, 
72–75) outlines some parallels, discusses the links to Buddhist jhānas and argues 
that sūtras 1.17–1.20 are taken from a different context or source.19 However, the 
links between the yogic and Buddhist interpretations of smṛti have received very 
scant attention so far.  
The first chapter of the Yogasūtra continues with discussion on the different 
means to achieve cessation, and obstacles on the path to absorption (samādhi), 
stating the conditions for the achievement of cognitive absorption beyond 
cognition. 
1.43: smṛti-pariśuddhau sva-rūpa-śūnya-iva-artha-mātra-nirbhāsānirvitarkā 
[Cognitive absorption is] beyond cognition [nirvitarka], as if empty of its own 
form, [there is the] appearance of the object-only, when the memory is 
purified/when there is purification through mindfulness. 
Translators render the tatpuruṣa compound smṛti-pariśuddhau in various ways: 
“on the purification of the depth-memory” (Feuerstein 1989, 53); “upon the 
purification of memory” (Houston 1995, 1.43); “when the memory is quite 
purified” (Woods 1914, 82); “[not] coloured by memory” (Hartranft 2003, 17). 
Here I propose an alternative reading of this compound, i.e. “when [there is] 
purification of/through mindfulness” for the following reason: the cognitive 
absorption is beyond cognition (nirvitarka), this is a state without fluctuations and 
hence, it would be problematic to read smṛti as memory because memory is 
                                                 
18 Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s contribution to the alternative reading of smṛti is examined in detail in the 
comprehensive and well presented article by Maharaj (2013). 
19 Sujato (2005, 146) also explores, rather briefly, the links between the two traditions and proposes 
that practice of mindfulness is described in the Yogasūtra; however, he reads smṛti as memory but 
proposes the term dhāraṇa to refer to mindfulness, since the Abhidharma lists dhāraṇa as a synonym 
for sati; this hypothesis would require further research. 
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defined in the Yogasūtra as a fluctuation. Some commentators and translators try 
to resolve this problem by interpreting smṛti as the “depth-memory” or the 
“subconscious” (e.g. Feuerstein 1989, 53–54) without providing a convincing 
argument or evidence for their presumption. Parallels in the Pāli Buddhist Canon 
indicate a close relation of this sūtra to the descriptions of meditative absorptions 
(dhyāna/jhāna); e.g. in Anupadasutta of Majjhimanikāya (MN 111), where the 
fourth jhāna is described: “… in the fourth jhāna, which has neither-pain-nor 
pleasure [there is] purity of mindfulness (satipārisuddhi) …” (Bodhi and 
Ñāṇamoli 2009, 900).20 Satipārisuddhi in this text may be alternatively read as 
“purity [achieved] by mindfulness”; the compound is actually interpreted in this 
way elsewhere, by Walshe is his translation of the Brahmajāla Sutta (2012, 86). 
Buddhist parallels (in the example given as well as in several other instances) 
indicate that mindfulness may be an alternative reading for smṛti in the Yogasūtra 
1.43 and consequently imply parallels between the nirvitarka samādhi of the 
Yogasūtra and the descriptions of the fourth jhāna in Buddhism. Vyāsa’s 
commentary on smṛti also allows this alternative interpretation; he comments that 
smṛti-pariśuddhau implies purification from ideas, inferences and words21 which 
corresponds to the purifying function of mindfulness in the development of the 
fourth jhāna.  
The term smṛti occurs also in two sūtras in the last chapter of the Yogasūtra 
which focuses, among other topics, on final liberation (kaivalya). The chapter first 
talks about the development of psychic powers and then discusses the law of 
karma. 
4.9. jāti-deśa-kāla-vyavahitānām-apy-ānantaryaṃ smṛti-saṃskārayor-eka-
rūpatvāt 
Because of the correspondence/uniformity between memory/mindfulness and 
mental impressions (saṃskaras), [there is] a succession [of karma-vipāka and 
vāsanās] even though they may be separated [in regard to] birth, place and 
time. 
                                                 
20 The passage from the Anupadasutta (MN 111, PTS ed. 3. 26) in Pāli (underlined by the author): 
“puna caparaṃ, bhikkhave, sāriputto sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā pubbeva 
somanassadomanassāna atthaṅgamā adukkhamasukhaṃ upekkhāsatipārisuddhiṃ catutthaṃ jhānaṃ 
upasampajja viharati. ye ca catutthe jhāne dhammā—upekkhā adukkhamasukhā vedanā 
passaddhattā cetaso anābhogo satipārisuddhi cittekaggatā ca, phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ 
chando adhimokkho vīriyaṃ sati upekkhā manasikāro...   
21  Yogabhāṣya 1. 42: śabdasaṃketasmṛtipariśuddhau śrutānumānajñānavikalpaśūnyāyāṃ 
samādhiprajñāyāṃ… (Bangali 1976, 22). 
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This sūtra continues the discussion on karma from 4.7 and 4.8; here karma is 
explained as continuation through time and space. The term smṛti is interpreted by 
most translators as “memory” (Woods 1914, 307; Houston 1995, IV.9) or “depth-
memory” (Hartranft 2003, 61; Feuerstein 1989, 131) or even the “personal 
subconscious” (Feuerstein 1989, 131). Vyāsa comments on the causal relationship 
between memory (smṛti) and mental impressions (saṃskāras)22: memory (smṛti) 
arises from mental impressions (saṃskāras) and mental impressions (saṃskāras) 
arise from memory (smṛti).23 However, if smṛti is read alternatively as mindfulness 
it would indicate that mindfulness arises successively together with mental 
impressions (saṃskāras), witnessing arising of resultant karma. In the Buddhist 
view, smṛti/sati is presented in the Abhidhamma as one of fifty-two mental factors 
(cetasika) and one of fifty mental formations/impressions (saṃskāras) which are 
also classified as mental factors (cetasika). Memory/mindfulness (smṛti) can arise 
together with other mental factors (cetasikas) in various types of consciousness; 
from this perspective, smṛti and saṃskaras are uniform (eka-rūpatva), both being 
cetasikas which may occur in successive mind-moments, being subject to the 
conditions arising in time and space. In Buddhism, it is smṛti that conditions 
purification of consciousness (smṛti-pariśuddhi) which leads to the state of 
samādhi. Modern interpreters do not look into Buddhist parallels but read the term 
smṛti as memory, following the commentarial tradition, including Vyāsa who 
views smṛti as a manifestation of impressions (saṃskāras) and hence both terms 
are interpreted to be uniform (Dasgupta 1924, 108).  
The last occurrence of the term smṛti is in sūtra 4.21, following the discussion 
as to whether consciousness can be conscious of itself and whether consciousness 
and its object can be known at the same time. In sūtra 4.20. it is stated that 
consciousness and its object cannot be cognised simultaneously; then the text 
continues with the problem of the regression of cognition. 
4.21. citta-antara-dṛśye buddhi-buddher atiprasaṅgaḥ smṛti-saṃkaraś-ca  
If consciousness could be perceived by another [consciousness] [this would 
lead to] regression from cognition to cognition and blending/confusion of 
memory/mindfulness. 
                                                 
22 The term saṃskāra is variously rendered into English: e.g. “subliminal activator” (Feuerstein 1989, 
38); “habitual potency” (Bangali 1976, 100); “latent deposit” (Woods 1914, 304); “impression” 
(Whicher 1998, 99); cf. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. 
23 Yogabhāṣya 4. 9: jātideśakālavyavahitebhyaḥ saṃskārebhyaḥ smṛtiḥ smṛteśca punaḥ saṃskārā 
ityevamete smṛtisaṃskārāḥ karmāśayavṛttilābhavaśadvyajyante (Bangali 1976, 100); for detailed 
comments see Whicher 1998, 99–100. 
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The sūtra states that cognition (buddhi) cannot look at the cognition itself since 
this would lead to regression and confusion of memory. Here the term smṛti is 
interpreted by most translators as “memory” (Feuerstein 1989, 137; Woods 1914, 
331; Houston 1995, IV.21; Hartranft 2003, 65). Vyāsa comments that if 
consciousness (citta) was grasped by another consciousness, this would lead to 
cognition (buddhi) grasped by another cognition and accordingly, the chain of 
cognitions would condition as many memories (smṛti), leading to confusion.24 If 
smṛti is read in the context of mindfulness, it would imply that, as consciousness 
cannot be conscious of itself, similarly, mindfulness cannot be mindful of being 
mindful since this would lead to regression; this is evident from the Buddhist 
perspective since there is no self (anātman) who observes or is mindful but there is 
only the process of successive ever-changing mind-moments. However, this view 
is rejected by the commentators on the Yogasūtra because they presume the 
existence of a Self (puruṣa) the owner of consciousness, as stated by Vyāsa: “The 
views of sāṃkhya-yoga and others denote by the word sva “the Self” (puruṣa), the 
owner, the enjoyer/experiencer of the consciousness.”25 
This brief overview of all the occurrences of smṛti in the Yogasūtra suggests 
that the term smṛti may encompass a wider semantic field—similarly to the 
concept of smṛti/sati in Buddhism—and encourages further enquiry into the 
different connotations of the term in the ancient yogic traditions which should be 
studied in a wider context of the different meditative schools of the time. The 
alternative reading of smṛti in the Yogasūtra proposed here can imply that 
mindfulness may have been a legitimate meditation method in the earliest yogic 
traditions, perhaps similarly understood and practised as in Buddhism—which, in 
spite of the abundance of primary and secondary sources available, requires 
further investigations about mindfulness. In the earliest commentary on the 
Yogasūtra by Vyāsa, at least in sūtras 1.11., 1.20 and 1.43, the term smṛti may be 
alternatively read and linked to the concept of mindfulness as understood in 
Buddhism. Later commentaries do not shed any new light on the possibility of this 
interpretation of smṛti and largely reflect new developments of religious traditions 
of India at the time. Consequently, all yogic schools of modern yoga in India (e.g. 
those developed by Iyengar, Satyananda, Desikachar etc.) reflect new 
developments (such as “Neo-Vedānta,” devotional Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva movements) 
                                                 
24  Yogabhāṣya 4. 21: yāvanto buddhibuddhināmanubhavāstāvatyaḥsmṛtayaḥ prāpnuvanti 
tatsaṅkarāccaikasmūtyanavadhāraṇa ca syādityevaṃ (Bangali 1976, 107). 
25 Yogabhāṣya 4. 21: sāṃkhyayogādayastu pravādāḥ svaśabdena puruṣameva svāminaṃ cittasya 
bhoktāramupayantīti (Bangali 1976, 107). 
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in their readings of the Yogasūtra, and consistently interpret smṛti with English 
term memory.    
 
6 Conclusion 
It has been only in the last decade that the concept of mindfulness has entered 
yoga, mainly in the “West,” under the influence of Buddhist meditation. 
Mindfulness, as interpreted in the context of modern Buddhism, is viewed as one 
of its key concepts and practical tools; it has been transformed and transplanted 
into new paradigms of the global spiritual and consumerist society. Consequently, 
mindfulness has also entered modern Yoga: presumably it is perceived, practised 
and interpreted in a different way to how it would have been in the time of the 
Yogasūtra, often separated from its traditional ethical and soteriological 
framework. The goals of mindfulness meditation are largely secularized: the goal 
of spiritual liberation (the main aim of the Yogasūtra as well as Buddhist 
meditation), if present at all, is a notion that has no immediateness—it remains a 
possibility in the future. The relatively new integration of the two traditions 
through mindfulness, though interpreted in new ways, initiates an enquiry about 
whether the synthesis of mindfulness and yoga is relatively new or perhaps is an 
ancient one, found already in the oldest recorded Indian texts on yoga, the 
Yogasūtra, perhaps lost in the yogic transmissions of India only to be reintroduced 
recently in a new context, with new interpretations and aims. 
The analysis above suggests that smṛti in the Yogasūtra and in Buddhist 
traditions (Pāli sati) needs to be revisited; in both traditions the term seems to 
cover a wide semantic spectrum, ranging between “memory” and “mindfulness”––
the two meanings may not have been separated the way they are in modern yoga, 
where the term is rendered as “memory” only and in modern Buddhism where 
smṛti/sati is usually read as mindfulness (and less frequently, as memory). It seems 
quite likely that the ur-text of Yoga, the Yogasūtra that we know today has been 
influenced by Buddhism and hence demonstrated here that it is possible to read 
smṛti as mindfulness, at least in some of the sūtras. However, there is no textual 
evidence that this meaning of smṛti has been transmitted in the Yogic traditions of 
India: the commentaries on the Yogasūtra (perhaps partly with the exception of 
Vyāsa) interpret the word smṛti as memory which has been followed by most 
modern translators and interpreters of yoga. Further in-depth study of meditation 
techniques such as mindfulness in ancient India is required, drawing from all 
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known traditions; this could create a broader spectrum of meanings and 
connotations for smṛti and other meditative terminology and practices of the time.   
 
References 
Anālayo. 2006. Satipaṭṭhāna: The Direct Path to Realization. Selangor: Buddhist Wisdom 
Centre. 
Arjunwadkar, Krishna, Ked. 2006. Pātañjala-yogasūtrāṇi: vyāsavṛtabhāṣyeṇa, 
vācaspatimiśrakṛtaṭīkāsanāthena, nāgojībhaṭṭakṛṭaṭīkayā ca sametāni. Pune: 
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 
Bangali, Baba, trans. 1976. Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali: With the Commentary of Vyāsa. Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass.  
Baer, Ruth A., ed. 2006. Mindfulness-Based Treatment Approaches: Clinician’s Guide to 
Evidence Base and Applications. Burlington, MA: Academic Press. 
Boccio, Frank Jude. 2004. Mindfulness Yoga: The Awakened Union of Breath, Body, and 
Mind. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications. 
Bodhi, trans. 1993. Abhidhammattha Sangaha: A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma: 
Pali Text, Translation and Explanatory Guide. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. 
Bodhi and Ñāṇamoli, trans. 2009. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A 
Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya. 4th ed. Boston: Wisdom Publications. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1993. The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India. Delhi: 
Motilal, Banarsidass. 
Buddhaghosa. 1956. The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga). Translated by Ñāṇamoli. 
Singapore: Singapore Buddhist Meditation Centre. 
Dasgupta, Surendranath. 1924. Yoga: As Philosophy and Religion. London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner. 
De Michelis, Elizabeth. 2004. A History of Modern Yoga. London: Continuum. 
–––. 2008. “Modern Yoga: History and Forms.” In Yoga in the Modern World: 
Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Mark Singleton and Jean Byrne, 17–35. 
Routledge Hindu Studies Series. London and New York: Routledge. 
Desikachar, T. K. V. 1995. The Heart of Yoga. Rochester: Inner Traditions International. 
Feuerstein, Georg. 1989. The Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali: A New Translation and 
Commentary. Rochester, Vermont: Inner Traditions International.  
Gethin, Rupert. 2011. “On Some Definitions of Mindfulness.” Contemporary Buddhism: 
An Interdisciplinary Journal 12 (1): 263–79. 
Hartranft, C., trans. 2003. The Yoga-Sutra of Patanjali. Boston: Shambhala. 
Tamara DITRICH: The Concept of smṛti in the Yogasūtra 
62 
Houston, Vyaas, trans. 1995. The Yoga Sutra Workbook: The Certainty of Freedom. New 
York: American Sanskrit Institute.  
Iyengar, Bellur Krishnamachar Sundararaja, trans. 1996. Light on the Yoga Sūtra of 
Pataṇjali. London: Thorsons.  
Kabat-Zinn, John. 2003. “Mindfulness-Based Interventions in Context: Past, Present, and 
Future.” Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 10 (2): 144–56. 
Kornfield, Jack. 2012. Bringing Home the Dharma: Awakening Right Where You Are. 
Boston and London: Shambala. 
Larson, Gerald James. 1989. “An Old Problem Revisited: The Relation between Samkhya, 
Yoga and Buddhism.” Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 15: 129–46. 
La Vallée-Poussin, Louis de. 1937. “Le Bouddhisme et la Yoga de Patañjali.” Mélanges 
chinois et bouddhiques 5: 223–42. 
Maharaj, Ayon. 2013. “Yogic Mindfulness: Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s Quasi-Buddhistic 
Interpretation of Smṛti in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 
(1): 57–78. Accessed February 28 2013. DOI: 10.1007/s10781-013-9174-7. 
Ñāṇapoṇika. 1962. The Heart of Buddhist Meditation. London: Rider. 
Singleton, Mark. 2008. “The Classical Reveries of Modern Yoga.” In Yoga in the Modern 
World: Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Mark Singleton and Jean Byrne, 77–99. 
Routledge Hindu Studies Series. London and New York: Routledge. 
Singleton, Mark and Byrne, Jean, eds. 2008. “Introduction.” In Yoga in the Modern World: 
Contemporary Perspectives, 1–14. Routledge Hindu Studies Series. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Sujato. 2005. A History of Mindfulness: How Insight Worsted Tranquility in the 
Satipatthana Sutta. Taipei: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational 
Foundation. 
Walshe, Maurice, trans. 2012. The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the 
Dīgha Nikāya. 3th ed. Boston: Wisdom Publications. 
Whicher, Ian. 1998. The Integrity of the Yoga Darsana: A Reconsideration of Classical 
Yoga. SUNY Series in Religious Studies. New York: State University of New York 
Press. 
Woods, James Haughton, trans. 1914. The Yoga-System of Patañjali: Or the Ancient Hindu 
Doctrine of Concentration of Mind. Harvard Oriental Series 17. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
